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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
Influence of Corruption, Foreign Direct Investment and Net Domestic Credit on 
Economic Growth 
 
 
In Asia, it is not clear whether governments can attract increased FDI by reducing 
corruption, or whether corruption is irrelevant to levels of GDP growth, especially if the 
mechanism of net domestic credit can be used to stimulate economic growth even in the 
absence of high levels of FDI.  The purpose of this study is to examine the potentially 
distinct effects of both FDI and net domestic credit on economic growth, as well as the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth. This relationship is studied using 
ex post facto data from a sample of Asian countries from the years 1980-2012. 
Corruption is found to have no tangible influence on how GDP interacts with either FDI 
or domestic credit, nor is corruption found to be a significant predictor of GDP growth in 
its own right. The data indicates that Asian economies can get away with corruption, as in 
the South Korean model, without jeopardizing FDI, and that middle-of-the-road domestic 
credit policies ought to be avoided.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview of the Study 
There are numerous ways in which developing countries attempt to raise foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Oftentimes, FDI is raised simply by creating better conditions 
for foreign investors to purchase stakes in a developing country’s national resources. This 
approach has been utilized extensively among the countries that belong to the 
Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Althani, 2012). In cases of this 
sort, the relationship between FDI, corruption, and economic growth is fairly 
straightforward. As long as foreign investors are guaranteed access to resources, and 
corruption does not interfere with their ability to obtain this access, FDI and economic 
growth both increase without regard to corruption. This pattern has been observed in the 
Gulf Arab countries, which, despite extraordinary levels of corruption (reflected, for 
example, in nepotism, ad hoc systems of law, and execrable human rights systems), have 
obtained both high levels of FDI and economic growth based on their abundance of 
natural resources that have drawn ongoing interest from foreign investors (Althani, 
2012). 
For some Asian countries, the question of the relationship between FDI, 
corruption, and economic growth is more complex. Asian countries do not tend to be 
resource-rich; rather, these countries have developed extensive expertise in 
manufacturing (Sabillon, 2000). Much FDI in Asian countries has been driven by foreign 
investors’ desire to benefit from the well-developed, profitable, and efficient 
manufacturing systems of Asian countries (Sabillon, 2000).  
 3 
 
In these circumstances, it is not clear what role corruption might play in the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth. Some Asian countries, in particular 
South Korea, have earned a reputation for corruption in both general terms and specific 
terms, for example through the preferential relationship between certain companies (the 
chaebols) and the government (Clifford, 1998). In such environments, the extension of 
domestic credit can also make up for the shortfall of foreign capital that is withheld 
because of corruption concerns (Clifford, 1998).  
 Other Asian countries have a stellar reputation for low corruption (Baik, Kim, & 
Vogel, 2011). The background of the proposed research project is the examination of 
what role, if any, corruption has played in either strengthening or weakening the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth in Asian countries.       
Background to the Issue 
On an international level, individual countries have been faced with increasingly 
fragile banking systems, shrinking economies, and rising unemployment. An additional 
challenge is the prevailing opinion of analysts about the global economy as a whole is 
that its current slow growth will last into the foreseeable future. Although steps are being 
taken to address these issues, policy responses have been mixed, and it is becoming 
increasingly clear that efforts to mitigate the crisis have resulted in choices that will limit 
trade. There is a clear indication that a country’s policy environment, whether 
protectionist or expansionary, will have a definitive impact on international trade with 
regards to business ethics, foreign direct investment, and other policy choices. 
Policies that have an effect on the economy can be separated into monetary and 
fiscal policies. Monetary policy, or the creation of economic policy within a country’s 
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central bank based on the exchange and flow of money, can determine national or 
international economic expansion through the control of the money supply. Classical 
macroeconomists, however, generally believe that expansionary monetary policy is for 
the most part ineffective or even harmful in fighting economic downturns such as the 
global crisis being faced at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As Krugman and 
Wells (2008) note, in the early years of Keynesian economics, macroeconomists were not 
against monetary expansion during recessions, but they tended to believe that it was of 
doubtful effectiveness. It was not until the development of new theoretical bases for 
monetary intervention, as pioneered by Milton Friedman and his followers, that 
economists were convinced that monetary policy is effective after all. By decreasing 
interest rates and thereby increasing the demand for money, governments can increase the 
velocity of exchange and trigger consumer spending. 
Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is more inwardly focused than monetary policy 
but still has an effect on international trade. As Krugman and Wells (2008) note, fiscal 
policy refers to the creation of guidelines for decisions that have to do with the purchase 
of goods on behalf of the government, the creation of incentives and barriers for the 
exchange of goods and services both within the country and across its borders, and the 
development of economic platforms or frameworks that have an effect on wages, 
employment and social services. With respect to international trade, for example, 
countries can develop policies that either support foreign direct investment or do not 
support this practice. The same can be said for policies that control ethical decision-
making by state officials or by companies.  
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At the same time, the relationship between corruption and the factors that lead to 
economic growth is a complex one. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public 
power for private benefit (Podobnik et al., 2008), and can be divided into what is known 
as influence corruption, which is conducted to shape the rules of the economy as a whole, 
or administrative corruption, which is conducted to bribe or influence public officials on 
a corporate or personal level (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). In this research 
project, both forms of corruption will be investigated.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following are the proposed research questions to be answered in the course of 
this study.  
RQ1. Is there a statistically significant relationship between FDI and economic 
growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012? 
H10: There is not a statistically significant relationship between FDI and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H1A: There is a statistically significant relationship between FDI and economic 
growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
RQ2. Is there a statistically significant relationship between net domestic credit 
and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012? 
H20: There is not a statistically significant relationship between net domestic 
credit and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H2A: There is a statistically significant relationship between net domestic credit 
and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
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RQ3. Does inclusion of the covariate of corruption alter the relationship between 
the independent variables of (a) FDI and net domestic credit and (b) the dependent 
variable of economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012?  
H30: The inclusion of the covariate of corruption does not alter the relationship 
between the independent variables of (a) FDI and net domestic credit and (b) the 
dependent variable of economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H3A: The inclusion of the covariate of corruption alters the relationship between 
the independent variables of (a) FDI and net domestic credit and (b) the dependent 
variable of economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
The three research questions are related to each other. RQ1 allows for the 
quantification of the general relationship between FDI and economic growth in the 
sample. RQ2 examines the impact of a measure of domestic economic activity, net 
domestic credit, on economic growth. RQ3 treats both domestic credit and FDI as 
independent variables and determines whether the association between these two 
independent variables and the dependent variable of growth is altered by corruption. As 
part of the analyses associated with RQ3, regression diagnostics can be used to determine 
whether FDI and net domestic credit are multicollinear; if they are not, then it can be 
concluded that net domestic credit and FDI exert fundamentally different influences on 
economic growth.  
Finally, a fourth RQ was dedicated to examining the direct relationship between 
corruption and economic growth 
RQ4: Is there a statistically significant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012? 
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H40: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H4A: There is a statistically significant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
Further detail on the means utilized to test hypotheses will be provided in the 
discussion of methodology.    
Problem Statement 
 This study addresses the problem that it is not wholly evident as to what policy 
choices related to corruption will have the most significant positive effects on economic 
growth. Particularly in Asia, it is not clear whether governments can attract increased FDI 
by reducing corruption, or whether corruption is irrelevant to levels of FDI, especially if 
the mechanism of net domestic credit can be used to stimulate economic growth even in 
the absence of high levels of FDI.  Asian governments seeking economic growth, who 
need a stronger empirical basis on which to determine how much effort to put into anti-
corruption efforts, will be well-served by the results of this empirical study.    
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this study is to examine the potentially distinct effects of both FDI 
and net domestic credit on economic growth, as well as examining the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth. This relationship will be studied using ex post 
facto data from a sample of Asian countries from the years 1980-2012. 
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Significance of the Study 
Many of the decisions made by the governments of developing countries are 
rooted in the desire to spark economic growth, often through the mechanism of increased 
FDI. In a global marketplace, governments do their best to attract investment from 
abroad; as such investment can be instrumental for growth. One of the questions facing 
Asian governments in particular is how much effort to expend on anti-corruption efforts. 
Generally speaking, Asia seems to be home to two models of corruption: (a) The South 
Korean model, in which some kinds of corruption (particularly in the relationship 
between industrial conglomerates and the government) are encouraged because of their 
economic efficiency or perceived economic efficiency (Kang, 2002) and (b) the 
Singaporean model, in which corruption is actively suppressed. What is not clear is 
whether, considered solely from the perspectives of increasing FDI and economic 
growth, it is better for Asian governments to try to promote the South Korean or the 
Singaporean model. By quantifying the influence of both FDI and net domestic credit on 
GDP growth, and treating corruption as a covariate in this model, this study will offer 
empirical support for a specific corruption strategy that works well in the context of Asia. 
Summary of the Study Overview 
The purpose of this quantitative, secondary data-based study is to examine the 
interrelationships between FDI, net domestic credit, corruption, and economic growth in 
a sample of Asian countries from the years 1980-2012. This study is worth carrying out 
because of the empirical support that it can provide as to the economic utility of anti-
corruption strategies considered in light of the relationships between FDI / net domestic 
credit and economic growth. With this justification in mind, some background literature 
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pertaining to the relationships between corruption, FDI, domestic credit, and economic 
growth will be presented in the second chapter of the study. The third chapter will contain 
a discussion of the methodology proposed to test the study’s hypotheses.      
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Overview of the Literature 
The literature review will examine a number of factors which have been explored 
in scholarly research, and which are connected to the overarching research questions and 
purpose of this study. The review will explore the theoretical foundation of corruption 
and instability analysis as linked to economic growth, and then examine factors linked to 
corruption, business development, foreign direct investment, domestic credit, and 
political instability. The review will end with a summary of the literature findings. 
Theoretical Foundation of Corruption and Instability Analysis 
 Socioeconomic challenges are revealed in the neoliberal approach to labor and 
trade which should be taken into account before examining the ways in which corruption 
processes are likely to occur. Dependency theory, which is applied labor theory, takes 
into account the broader global environment as a means of understanding how and why 
corruption is likely to occur. In this theory, it is made clear that the efforts of workers in 
developing countries become more and more dependent to those in a position of power 
over sources of capital. In the long run, therefore, the overarching power of the Western 
nations and multinational corporations, as noted by McBride (2005), will act to 
permanently shift the opportunities poor countries have to participate in the global 
market. In other words, because they become dependent on neoliberal regimes and their 
corporate interests, poor countries providing goods and services will have to continue to 
push down their labor costs or risk losing that business to another, poorer country. 
Corruption can therefore thrive where people are more desperate, but also where 
companies are likely to take advantage of power imbalances in the market and in the 
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economy as a whole. As Workman (2009) notes, “minimum wage policy under 
neoliberalism ‘has gone from being a device to ratify low-wage spheres in the economy 
to being a legislative instrument in the assault on all wage earners” (p. 83). In other 
words, because those with financial power have the ability to control the ways in which 
we exchange goods and capital, the poor or those without an ability to contribute on a 
financial basis are naturally excluded from participation in decision-making processes in 
corporations and from the protection of the state on a global basis.  
McKay and Sumner (2008) warn that the relationships between growth, poverty 
and other human development outcomes vary substantially across outcome, place and 
time depending on the kinds of companies and political leadership forces which occupy 
different countries and their strategic goals. The social context of work space and who 
controls it, in this way, has a deep effect on the ways in which individuals participate in 
the global economy. According to Herod (1997), this means that people begin to 
internalize their social roles as linked to production and the economy of the state. In other 
words, workers who are disenfranchised and underpaid recognize their lack of power in 
the greater, globalized world of labor, and therefore need different ways of accumulating 
security. If the poor gain wealth through corruptive practices, these practices are repeated 
on a larger and more substantive basis over the long term, leading to corruptive acts at the 
corporate and the political levels as well Karakowsky et al., 2005). 
Corruption, Business Development, and the Economy 
There are a number of levels of corruption that can have an effect on the 
economy. As noted in the literature, this starts at the level of corruption in economic 
policy. For example, Mattoo and Subramanian (2009) note that recently, “exchange rate 
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changes — in particular persistent undervaluation of major currencies — these last few 
years have been substantial, leading to one of the most pressing contemporary problems: 
global imbalances” (p. 4). They note that this is specifically true for China, which has 
been singled out by both scholars and global leaders as having a currency which is being 
consistently undervalued. In particular, the WTO and the IMF are particularly concerned 
about the prevalence of dumping, not only by China but by other Asian nations prone to 
undervaluing their currencies. A tendency towards making products more affordable 
through cheap currency cuts off trade opportunities from smaller emerging nations in 
Africa and Asia, and even from countries as large as India with stronger valuation 
policies. Ter-Minassian (2009) warns against imbalances between local and foreign 
currency debt, such as that used by China, in order to reduce any temptation to build up 
and then inflate away local currency debt over the long term. Nonetheless, there is some 
evidence that with more democratic political processes in place, it could be possible to 
offset some of these policy-level challenges (Cooper Drury, Krieckhaus, & Lusztig, 
2006). 
On a more fundamental business level, corruption and even a lack of ethical 
practices can also have negative effects. For example, guanxi, the Chinese concept which 
is loosely connected to the Western idea of social capital, is the primary source of 
governance for decision making in the Chinese business context (Zhuang & El-Ansary, 
2008). Businesses incorporating guanxi principles in China experience a blurring of lines 
between seller and customer and between work and bribery because the concept of 
bribery is part of the natural Chinese work relationship (Zhuang & El-Ansary, 2008). 
Power is not based on the exchange of money, rather on the ability of individual 
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companies to continue to demonstrate their commitment to the relationship. As Zhuang 
and El-Ansary (2008) note, interpersonal guanxi is not necessarily solely associated with 
instrumental power, i.e., the ability of individuals and companies to get things done, but 
rather on a combination of instrumental and emotional power, and one’s ability to 
exercise both. In this case, to abide by the local laws of the host country would mean to 
use bribery to acquire guanxi, but this is not viable from a legal perspective in the US, 
which requires companies to meet the standards of their home country with respect to 
bribery (Karakowsky et al., 2005). 
Bhagwati (2004) suggests that it is not globalization itself, but rather specific 
dimensions of global business practices, that leads to global corruption. In cases such as 
the use of guanxi in China and other similar nations, it is important for businesses to 
recognize that despite the fact that it is common that does not mean that it is right or fair. 
Most importantly, it is illegal and businesses in the US can be held accountable for their 
actions in other countries. It is difficult to not follow local norms, but at the same time 
there are clear reasons for the abhorrence of these practices. If the goal of the firm is to be 
able to support developing economies, then, ideally, the market should decide which 
local actors should be supported rather than the hierarchy of Chinese work relationships. 
Over the long term, rejecting guanxi will not only be a more ethical approach, but it will 
likely work in the best interests and cost structures of the economy because market forces 
will be permitted to prevail, rather than prevented from occurring in the first place.  
Political Instability and the Economy 
The circular relationship between corruption and business development may be 
mitigated by political structures and democratic processes, or hindered by them (Cooper 
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Drury et al., 2006). Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) note that the prevailing viewpoint in 
policy as suggested by international organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD 
and the IMF concludes that open markets and free trade policies are the foremost 
indicators of economic growth. This conclusion leads these organizations to the belief 
that exchange rates are both distorted and made more variable by a lack of open and free 
trade, which is linked to political instability. This, suggest the same organizations, makes 
it more difficult for countries in the developing world to participate fully in international 
trade. Setting fiscal policy which moves nominal exchange rates in any direction, 
however, has the subsequent effect of large swings in real exchange rates in these 
countries’ economies (Rodriguez & Rodrik).  
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) conclude that instead of a distorted relationship 
with trade policy, it is the variation in exchange rates that have an effect on economic 
development because of the impact of psychosocial assumptions about the kinds of 
governments who proliferate these frequent changes. Countries with high variability 
include Iraq, Uganda, Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guyana, Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, 
and Guatemala (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000, p.  278), which experienced rapid changes in 
fiscal policy due to widespread political instability in the latter half of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s. There is a relationship between policy choices and exchange 
rates but the variability involved may be intrinsically linked to governmental instability. 
This creates an environment within which, as Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) posit, there is 
a black-market premium on exchange and resource allocation which leads to rationing in 
the market for foreign currency. In these situations, therefore, foreign exchange 
restrictions act as a trade barrier. This will likely lead to the development of a wedge 
 15 
 
between import and export exchange rates and the creation of a two-tiered system of 
exchange. Unfortunately, within this policy model, governments often attempt “to 
maintain a low exchange rate in order to counteract transitory confidence or balance-of-
payments crises” (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000, 288) which lead to rapid inflation and 
decrease equilibrium within balance of payments as a result. 
There is as well, as Rogoff (2006) states, an inherent assumption that 
globalization can lead to destabilization in its quest for growth as the world’s financial 
systems become more integrated and complex in their responsibilities. One might 
assume, given the current global economic crises, that this is in fact true. Rogoff (2006) 
points out, however, that market and monetary instability has declined on an international 
basis over the past twenty years despite political and economic instability. Even our 
current challenges may be estimated as an irregularity and adjustment rather than a 
fundamental flaw in the way that economies operate in a globalized manner. 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Economy 
On a business level, the possibility of growth from foreign direct investment can 
be affected negatively by corruption as well (Shao, Ivanov, Podobnik, & Stanley, 2007). 
This is because “size ranking and growth of firms, universities, urban centers, countries 
and even people’s personal fortunes follow a power law over a broad range of scales” 
(Shao et al., 2007, p. 59) linked to foreign direct investment which means that this is a 
desired result for growing economies. It is also possible, however, that support of some 
foreign direct investment mechanisms can lead to corruption, as is seen in the case of 
China’s investment in Africa (Ter-Minassian, 2009). Communities and tribes may have 
been living and working the land in these areas for hundreds of years, but still do not 
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have land ownership because systemic development has lagged in their particular area. In 
these cases, governments under pressure to create jobs take the land and allocate it to 
China with the promise that jobs will be created, but there are rarely any environmental 
or social audits which take place before this occurs (Karakowsky et al., 2005). In these 
cases, people are displaced and lose their living, namely farming off the land and selling 
goods at a local market. This has a negative effect on the local economy, and only serves 
to increase the economic potential of the multinational firm (Cooper Drury et al., 2006). 
An example of how the hierarchy of Chinese working practices can illustrate the 
connection between corruption, foreign direct investment, and economic challenge is 
presented by Barboza (2008). Many American companies are moving production to 
Chinese shores in the hope of driving down the cost of labor. Unfortunately, the situation 
for factory workers in China is not only oppressive, it is dangerous. As noted by Barboza 
(2008), the working conditions exposed by National Labor Committee in that country are 
those in which “factory workers lose or break about 40,000 fingers on the job every year” 
(p. 1). On top of this lack of safety in the workplace, these same factories are likely to 
employ children and pay people less than minimum wage, all because the factory workers 
have little power over their working conditions.  
The challenge that is faced by many of these workers is that the companies for 
which they work are employed, in turn, by some of the biggest corporations in the United 
States who rely on local business managers and local corporations to take care of their 
labor needs. This means that there is an incentive to keep on producing goods as cheaply 
as possible, according to Barboza (2008), so that the Chinese factory owners can retain 
their contracts with these corporations. As noted by Barboza (2008), although new laws 
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have been put into effect to observe these practices, the factories are becoming more 
stringent with their security so that it is becoming more difficult to measure abuses 
against workers. 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008) point out that currency overvaluation is also often an 
active factor to undo the effects of trade liberalization and foreign direct investment, as 
they reflect became the case in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mexico in 
particular was subject to this challenge after the policy decision to revalue the peso 
resulted in a rapid devaluation after what may have been considered an artificial nominal 
inflation. The immediate effect of this change was a rapid retreat by American and 
Canadian producers who had relocated facilities to the region to take advantage of local 
wage differentials. Associated inflation made it difficult for North American corporations 
to move essential goods into Mexico for the purpose of production. If policies result in 
these actions then corporations will necessarily become reticent to build permanent 
facilities and participate in the economy, either through a local partner or through foreign 
direct investment. 
In stronger economies, though, there is a correlation between foreign direct 
investment and economic growth. Boivin and Giannoni (2008) note that, in the US, 
foreign direct investment variables were identified as having a definitive effect on 
international forces with respect to trade and monetary policy. These variables and the 
extent to which they have an effect, nonetheless, have changed over the last twenty years. 
Since the mid 1980s, “the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP has increased from 
approximately 80% to more than 300% in the 23 most industrialized economies” (Boivin 
& Giannoni, 2008, p. 2). The US economy has demonstrated similar responses to 
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international trade shocks during this time period, but the growing importance of global 
forces has contributed to reducing the length of time by which the US and other countries 
respond to these shocks. Overall, Boivin and Giannoni (2008) conclude that the effect of 
global forces has largely only been felt in the US post 2000. It has, however, contributed 
to an overall weakening of interest rates, as determined by Alan Greenspan in his role 
heading the US Federal Reserve (Boivin & Giannoni, 2008). 
The Asian Developmental Model 
 Some of the decisions that Asian governments have made to attract FDI, issue net 
domestic credit, and establish the acceptability of specific levels of corruption can be 
understand through the larger paradigm of the Asian Developmental Model, which will 
receive close attention in this section of the literature review.  
East Asia has achieved a high level of economic success, as measured by growth 
in growth domestic product (GDP) and other indicators, in the past three decades. There 
is an academic consensus that one of the reasons for East Asia’s prosperity has been the 
use of the so-called Asian Developmental Model, in which the state subsidizes and 
otherwise favors select industries as a means of rapidly boosting competitiveness 
(Haggard, 1990). The Asian Developmental Model has attracted both support and 
criticism in the literature. Some classic criticisms of the model (see for example Kang, 
2002; Krugman, 1994; Wade, 1990) are that it is (a) inefficient in the choice of which 
companies to favor; (b) a precursor of corruption and cronyism, both of which lower 
economic as well as political efficiency; and (c) economically unnecessary, as it distorts a 
free market that ought to be left alone. However, there is also evidence that the Asian 
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Development Model is generally efficient and has not been shown to create extraordinary 
levels of corruption.  
There is near-universal consensus among detractors of the Asian Developmental 
Model that it is both corrupt and corrupting (Kang, 2002; Krugman, 1994; Wade, 1990). 
There is much evidence in favor of this claim. For example, in 2009, former South 
Korean President Roh Moo-hyun admitted to accepting vast bribes from chaebols during 
his time in power (Heo & Roehrig, 2010). Roh Moo-hyun’s successor, Lee Myung-bak, 
as well as other South Koreans politicians (such as Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo), 
have been implicated in similar scandals (Heo & Roehrig, 2010). In Japan and Singapore, 
two other Asian states that have adopted variations of the Asian Economic Model, there 
is ample evidence not only that there is an incestuous relationship between politicians and 
business interests but also that the world of business is itself corrupt. From this 
perspective, the charge against the Asian Developmental Model is that any system 
designed to favour specific companies and industries over others cannot long do so on a 
rational basis, and must devolve into a kind of arbitrary cronyism that reduces the 
efficiency and transparency of politics as well as business (Kang, 2002; Wade, 1992).  
 The evidence for the corrupting influence of Asian Developmental Model is 
considerable and should not be discounted. However, this evidence has not necessarily 
been placed in the proper context by detractors of the Asian Developmental Model. 
Clifford (1998) pointed out that agricultural economy inherited by South Korean 
President Park Chung-Hee in 1963 was at least as corrupt as the chaebol system that Park 
erected during his 15 years in power. It is also worth pointing out that Japan’s zaibatsu 
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structure predates the Asian Developmental Model. Zaibatsus were first formed in 
Imperial Japan and declared illegal by the U.S. occupation authority in 1945 (Bird, 2001).       
 Thus, the first counter-argument to the claim that the Asian Developmental Model 
is a corrupting influence is to invoke the earlier histories of Japan and South Korea, 
which, like other Asian countries (Bird, 2001), were characterized by high levels of 
corruption and collusion throughout the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, well before 
the Asian Developmental Model was invented or implemented. The second counter-
argument to the corruption claim is to argue that the Asian Developmental Model’s 
efficiency benefits outweigh the costs of the corruption that accompanies the model.  
 The Asian Developmental Model is best understood through the concept of trade-
offs, especially as faced by Japan (in the 1940s and 1950s) and South Korea (in the 1960s 
and 1970s). Both Japanese and South Korean policy-makers had a two-step 
understanding of efficiency: First there would be a period of unfairness in which equity 
(defined as the maximum good of the maximum number of citizens) was sacrificed for 
efficiency; then increased efficiency would bootstrap the entire nation into a position of 
increased equity (Heo & Roehrig, 2010). In this sense, the logic of the Asian 
Developmental Model was close to that of Soviet and Chinese collectivization. 
Collectivized governments also asked ordinary citizens to ensure a period of scarcity and 
unfairness so that their countries as a whole could make, in Mao’s terminology, great 
leaps forward (Clifford, 1998). 
 For Japan and South Korea, the trade-offs between equity and efficiency were less 
extreme than in the Communist countries, but the underlying premise was the same. 
Policy in both countries dictated that an elite class of large, export-oriented, and 
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government-favored businesses would receive preferential treatment in exchange for 
developing a national surplus that could later be shared with all citizens (Kang, 2002). 
This process was envisioned as a kind of two-step bootstrapping, with national 
corporations initially reaping a huge advantage over foreign competitors by obtaining tax 
breaks, subsidies, and other forms of preferential treatment, and later carrying out their 
side of the social contract to create surplus for all citizens. 
 The efficiency-equity trade-off failed miserably in China and the Soviet Union, 
but succeeded in Japan and South Korea. Starting in 1963, the Park government in South 
Korea began a policy of aggressive favoritism that created the chaebol. A succinct 
overview of this era in South Korean industrial policy was offered by Hass (2006), who 
noted both the costs and benefits of this variation of the Asian Developmental Model: 
Park Chung Hee’s military regime forced chaebols to produce national wealth. 
Close links with the state facilitated targeted investment and production, and the 
centralized structure helped chaebols coordinate investment and production for 
foreign markets. While the chaebols were heralded for leading Korea out of 
poverty into the ranks of the developed world, problems of corruption set 
in…revealing the dark side to tight hierarchy with limited transparency and 
external accountability (e.g. to differentiated stakeholders) (p. 111). 
 For South Korea, the trade-off was between the creation of national wealth and 
the achievement of a culture of transparency and accountability. It is certain that Park’s 
policies, and South Korea’s subsequent implementation of the Asian Developmental 
Model, led to various forms of corruption (Heo & Roehrig, 2010). However, the Asian 
Developmental Model also delivered an unprecedented improvement in national wealth. 
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In 1962, the year before Park Chung-Hee became President of South Korea, the country’s 
gross domestic product per capita was $1168 in 2000 USD and the GDP was $3 billion 
(World Bank, 2013b). By the time Park was assassinated in 1979, the country made 
enormous strides in both creating and distributing national wealth. The South Korean 
economy quadrupled in size between 1962 and 1969, with GDP per capita rising from 
$1168 to $3462. In exchange for a system that embraced certain forms of corruption, an 
enormous amount of economic and political efficiency was achieved (Hass, 2006). The 
same was true for Japan, which created keiresus to take the place of zaibatsus (Bird, 
2001). Statistics from the World Bank demonstrate the rapid growth of these two 
economies as other economies in East Asia languished. In particular, gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth percentage, GDP per capita, and final consumption expenditures 
offer a portrait of two countries that not only grew their economies rapidly, but raised 
income in all population segments and allowed people to spend more freely on goods and 
services. South Korea’s GDP soared from $2.8 billion in 1960 to $13 billion in 1979 
(World Bank, 2013b) . Over the same time period, GDP per capita tripled. In Japan, GDP 
went from $7.1 billion in 1960 to $28.1 billion in 1980, and GDP per capita went from 
$7,744 to over $24,000 (World Bank, 2013b; all figures in constant 2000 USD). Clearly, 
then, economic efficiency was a sizeable and important result of the implementation of 
the Asian Developmental Model in South Korea and Japan.  
 In neoclassical economics, government favoritism is almost always held to be a 
distorting force (Krugman, 1994; Wade, 1992). The theory is that, by favoring certain 
companies and industries over others, a government creates a disincentive for non-
favored businesses to innovate and prosper and an incentive for favored businesses to 
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become lazy about the creation of wealth. However, this theory was not affirmed by facts 
on the ground in South Korea and Japan. In both countries, companies and industries that 
were not favored (including Honda and Sony in Japan) none the less managed to prosper, 
and companies that were favored did not slacken their productivity and efficiency (Bird, 
2001). It is not fully clear why, at least in the cases of South Korea and Japan, the Asian 
Developmental Model did not bring about the kinds of market behavior predicted by 
neoclassical economic theory. One potential explanation is cultural in nature, and 
suggests that the social contract between the favored company, the government, and the 
citizens had much more force than it would have had in an individualistic Western 
society driven by self-interest rather than collective interest (Bird, 2001).  
 For example, it is tempting to contrast the behavior of favored Japanese 
companies and keiresus with the behavior of American companies (including banks and 
car manufacturers) that have also been the recipients of government largesse. In Japan, 
unemployment has remained far lower than in America, and has historically stood at one 
of the lowest rates in the industrialized world. Bird (2001) and Clifford (1998) have 
argued that Japanese companies have a profound commitment to the notion of lifetime 
employment: a commitment that is partly due to cultural notions of solidarity and partly 
due to a conscious form of repayment to the government. In other words, Japanese 
companies have taken self-regulating actions (such as keeping executive salaries much 
lower than they are in the United States and other developed economies, and deliberately 
employing more people than economically necessary) to repay the Japanese government 
and society for their support. The same patterns can be seen in South Korea, whose 
chaebols have also made a commitment to long-term employment and reduced profit-
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taking in an effort to distribute more of the economic pie to the nation at large (Clifford, 
1998).  
 Clearly, then, market distortion is not as potent a counter-argument to the Asian 
Developmental Model as some of the model’s detractors might believe. In Japan and 
South Korea, a culture of solidarity between business, government, and society (Bird, 
2001; Clifford, 1998) has overcome many of the distorting effects that neoclassical 
economic theory predicts will take place in climates of favoritism. Additionally, a culture 
of hard work (Hass, 2006) has overcome the theoretical disincentive posed by favoritism 
otherwise there would be no explanation for the success of Honda, Sony, Nintendo, and 
many other companies that have succeeded despite not initially being favored by the 
Japanese government.  
It is certainly possible to criticize the performance of many Asian economies, 
including those of South Korea and Japan. The Japanese recession of the 1990s and the 
Asian Currency Crisis of 1998 deflated some of the previous enthusiasm about the 
region’s economic miracles. However, to focus too closely on details of economic 
performance is to ignore the vast strides made by South Korea and Japan under the Asian 
Developmental Model. In 1963, South Korea was not merely one of the poorer countries 
in Asian, but one of the poorer countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of $1168 in 
constant 2000 USD (World Bank, 2013b). For much of 1945-1954 periods, Japan 
experienced acute deprivation that was even worse than that of South Korea. Masuji 
Ibuse (1988) wrote of post-war Japan that “Everything was so scarce, you were glad to 
get hold of anything, whatever it might be” (p. 64). In both Japan and South Korea, two 
decades of implementing the Asian Developmental Model resulted in two of the most 
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remarkable economic turnarounds in human history. These turnarounds took place in the 
midst of many other failed economic transitions in the region, with China and North 
Korea coming to mind.  
 The Asian Developmental Model certainly has its drawbacks, including 
corruption and perhaps occasional market distortions caused in inefficient choices of 
favored companies and industries. None the less, these drawbacks must be weighed 
against the enormous benefits delivered by this model in what is historically a very short 
timeframe. To be sure, in an ideal world, there would no trade-offs, and countries could 
develop economically without having to trade efficiency against equity and in a state of 
Pareto optimality. However, in the real world of limited resources, difficult decisions 
have to be made to bootstrap countries into better economic conditions. Seen from this 
perspective, the benefits of the Asian Developmental Model should be considered as 
important as the costs.     
Summary of the Literature 
The review of the literature explored the theoretical foundation of corruption and 
instability analysis as linked to economic growth, and examined factors linked to 
corruption, business development, net domestic credit, foreign direct investment, and 
political instability. The literature review found that there is research which both 
demonstrates a connection between these factors and economic growth, and illustrates the 
challenges that separate opportunity from growth linked to these factors as well. In the 
following chapter, the methodology for this study will be outlined in detail. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Overview of the Research Method 
The methodology for this research project is a descriptive quantitative analysis of 
ex post facto data, as recommended by Li, Xu, and Zou (2000), from policy and 
statistical factors as collected from Asian countries over the period from 1980 to 2012. 
The main statistical tests involved in the methodology will be regression analysis, 
analysis of covariance, and correlation.  
Rationale For Research Method  
Quantitative descriptive studies usually operate on the basis of thesis statements, 
which push the quantitative descriptive research process toward deduction (Creswell, 
2009). The following items are the fundamental components of this kind of quantitative 
research design: (a) information is quantified by the use of numeric data to describe 
trends, attitudes, or opinions of the sample populations, (b) it includes complied closed-
ended questions and predetermined approaches, (c) it relates variables directly to research 
questions or hypotheses, (d) it uses quantitative standards of validity and reliability, and 
(e) the research processes either tests or verifies theories or explanations (Creswell 2009). 
A quantitative approach to research is non-intrusive and handles naturally 
occurring phenomena (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2007). Furthermore, the data collection 
procedures employed in this type of research methodology may be very explicit. Some 
sorts of instruments, for instance, make use of highly refined categories of behavior and 
produce quantitative data. A quantitative approach to research may place attention on 
individual subjects and delve into great depth and detail in elucidating them within the 
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research context (Gall et al., 2007). In this construction and analysis of the data, 
quantitative data are collected and analyzed and then interpreted (Creswell, 2009). 
In using secondary data via ex post facto research, it is important to clearly 
understand both the advantages and disadvantages of the data source. McMillan and 
Schumacher (2006) listed the advantages of using secondary data as: (a) it saves the 
researcher time from designing a research study and collecting primary data, (b) the 
researcher can take existing data and conduct or further expand research, (c) it is cost 
effective because the researcher does not need to fund the primary data collection, (d) 
Many secondary data set are freely accessible in electronic format from reputable 
organizations, and (e) the quality of the data set being used may well have a high quality 
of validity and reliability. 
Population and Sample 
 The population for the study consists of all Asian countries. The sample will 
consist of India, China, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, and Japan. This sample was 
chosen because it combines large- and small-population, high- and low-income and high- 
and low-corruption Asian countries. Stratifying the sample in this manner is likely to 
yield more useful research insights than if the sample had homogenous characteristics.   
Data Collection 
 The following data will be collected for each of the six countries in the sample for 
the period from 1980-2012: 
• Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) (dependent variable) 
• Annual FDI (as % of GDP) (independent variable) 
• Corruption (measured on the World Bank, 2013a) scale 
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• Net domestic credit 
All data will be obtained from the World Bank (2013a, 2013b).  
Data Analysis 
The purpose of data analysis will be to test the following null hypotheses of the 
study: 
H10: There is not a statistically significant relationship between FDI and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H20: There is not a statistically significant relationship between net domestic 
credit and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H30: The inclusion of the covariate of corruption does not alter the relationship 
between the independent variables of (a) FDI and net domestic credit and (b) the 
dependent variable of economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
H40: There is not a statistically significant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. 
The first null hypothesis will be tested through the use of regression analysis. 
There are various forms of regression, including linear and non-linear regression 
(Johnson & Reynolds, 2010). Regressive curve fitting will be used in SPSS ™ (the 
software program in which all data analysis related to the study will be carried out) to 
determine which regression model is most suited to the data. In particular, linear 
regression, quantile regression, exponential regression, and quadratic regression will be 
tested. The form of regression with the highest R2 will be chosen as the most appropriate 
fit for the data. Afterwards, the p value of the chosen regression model will be consulted 
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in order to test the first null hypothesis. If the p value is below .05, the null hypothesis 
will not be accepted.  
The third null hypothesis will be tested through the use of partial correlation 
analysis in both parametric and non-parametric formats, depending on which model 
yields the higher R2 value. If the addition of corruption raises or lowers the R2 by more 
than 5% of the original R2 value, and if the p value of the correlation is below .05, the 
third null hypothesis of the study will not be accepted. 
The purpose of these two forms of data analysis is to quantify the effect of 
corruption on the relationship between FDI and economic growth. It is hypothesized that 
the relationship between FDI and economic growth will be weakened (in the form of a 
lower R2) when corruption is high and also that the relationship between domestic net 
credit and economic growth will be weakened when corruption is high.          
The fourth null hypothesis will be tested through the use of regression analysis.   
Ethical Considerations 
The only data to be used in this study are publicly available, as noted above. 
Because archival data will be used, there will be no ethical considerations in data 
collection to be made, and because only aggregate data will be used, permission will not 
need to be granted by individual states. Nonetheless, research bias is acknowledged and 
considered in designing this study. Bias may exist at different levels and degrees, but 
verification processes for the use of ex post facto data have been identified to minimize 
the risk of bias in data collection. Researcher bias in data assessment will be considered 
at the time of analysis.  
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Summary of the Methodology 
The methodology for this research project is a descriptive quantitative analysis of 
ex post facto data from India, China, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, and Japan. In 
this study, the independent variables will be FDI and net domestic credit, the dependent 
variable will be annual GDP growth (%), and the moderating variable will be corruption. 
Regression analysis and correlation will be used to analyze the relationships between the 
variables and test the hypotheses associated with the study.   
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Chapter 4: Results of the Study 
Overview of Results 
The results of the study will be provided in three sections, with each section 
corresponding to one of the hypotheses of the study. A brief conclusion will summarize 
the findings of the study. Graphs will be used wherever appropriate.  
RQ1 Results 
The first research question was as follows: Is there a statistically significant 
relationship between FDI and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries from 
1980-2012? The first step to answering this question was to produce a scatter plot and to 
test it against various regression models: 
 
Figure 1. GDP Growth by FDI. Note the angle of the quadratic curve.  
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Curve-fitting confirmed that quadratic regression was the best  fit for the data; 
logarithmic, exponential, and growth regression models were not found to be significant: 
Table 1 
Curve-Fitting Estimates, Linear & Quadratic Models, RQ1 
Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
Equation Model Summary Parameter 
Estimates 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear .058 11.825 1 192 .001 5.158 .182 
Quadratic .083 8.644 2 191 .000 4.789 .498 
        
 
While both models were significant (p < .005), the R2 of the quadratic model (.083) was 
higher than the R2 of the linear model (.058); in the quadratic model, 8.3% of the 
variance in GDP growth is explained by variance in FDI. Figure 1 displays the so-called 
frown curve in the quadratic model, indicating that mid-level FDI (in the zone of 10% of 
GDP) is associated with highest GDP growth. When FDI is either low or high, it is not 
associated with high GDP growth. The point of diminishing returns appears to be where 
FDI is 20% of GDP. 
 One of the questions raised in the quadratic regression model was where exactly 
an Asian economy should try to be, in terms of FDI as a percentage of GDP, to raise 
GDP. This question was solved by ten separate quantile regressions that tested the 
relationship between FDI and GDP at every decile from 10 to 90, and then at 99. The 
results were as follows: 
Table 2 
Overview of Quantile Regression Results, RQ1 
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Quantile Significance R2 Beta 
10 .638 .0036 .0485389 
20 .073 .0181 .1834272 
30 < .001 .0325 .1949924 
40 < .001 .0440 .2223054 
50 .006 .0502 .2050102 
60 < .001 .0502 .2588598 
70 < .001 .0538 .2710927 
80 < .001 .0389 .181916 
90 < .001 .0264 .2088402 
99 .383 .0257 .0263038 
 
It is interesting to observe that the beta coefficient rose linearly, peaked at the 70th 
percentile of FDI, and declined precipitously thereafter. These data indicate that being in 
the 70th percentile of FDI (as % of GDP) is associated with the highest likelihood of 
obtaining an increase in GDP. Beyond the 70th percentile, accumulating FDI does not 
seem to be associated with GDP growth (a conclusion that is, subject, of course, to the 
limitations of the sample).  
RQ2 Results 
The second research question was as follows: Is there a statistically significant 
relationship between domestic credit and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries 
from 1980-2012? As with RQ1, The first step to answering this question was to produce a 
scatter plot and to test it against various regression models: 
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Figure 2. GDP Growth by domestic credit. Note the angle of the quadratic curve.  
 Domestic credit behaved similarly to FDI in its effect in GDP growth in that a 
quadratic model best fit the data: 
Table 3 
Curve-Fitting Estimates, Linear & Quadratic Models, RQ2 
Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
R 
Square 
F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 
Linear .159 36.945 1 196 .000 6.615 -3.231E-015 
Quadratic .169 19.849 2 195 .000 6.734 -5.750E-015 
While both models were significant (p < .001), the R2 of the quadratic model 
(.169) was higher than the R2 of the linear model (.159); in the quadratic model, 16.9% 
 35 
 
of the variance in GDP growth is explained by variance in domestic credit. Figure 2 
displays the so-called smile curve in the quadratic model, indicating that low and high 
levels of domestic credit are associated with higher GDP growth, but that medium levels 
of domestic credit are associated with low levels of GDP growth. This analysis indicates 
that both conservative and highly liberal domestic credit policies work well in terms of 
stimulating economic growth, but that middle-of-the-road credit policies are associated 
with low levels of GDP growth. The regression analysis could not reveal whether this 
effect is causal, and the results are also subject to the fact that there are only six Asian 
countries in the sample.    
Since the quadratic model was the best fit, quantile regression was carried out in 
order to observe the shifts in p, R2, and beta coefficient values every decile. Before 
presenting this analysis, it is important to observe that all of the beta coefficients were 
negative; in other words, whereas FDI was positively associated with GDP growth, 
domestic credit volume was negatively associated with GDP growth, which could 
indicate the use of domestic credit as a stimulus measure in low-growth years.   
Table 4 
Overview of Quantile Regression Results, RQ2 
Quantile Significance R2 Beta 
10 .264 .0296 -1.60e-15 
20 < .001 .0953 -2.63e-15 
30 < .001 .1013 -2.77e-15 
40 < .001 .1059 -3.39e-15 
50 < .001 .1218 -3.64e-15 
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60 < .001 .1212 -3.98e-15 
70 < .001 .1286 -3.83e-15 
80 < .001 .1231 -3.66e-15 
90 .004 .1267 -3.87e-15 
99 < .001 .1330 -4.43e-15 
  
Domestic credit at the lowest decile (<10th percentile) was least associated with GDP 
decline.   
The different shape of the quadratic curves in RQs 1 and 2 already indicated that 
FDI and domestic credit appeared to be behaving in entirely different ways with respect 
to association with GDP growth. To further test this finding, multicollinearity diagnostics 
were conducted as part of a linear regression analysis: 
Table 5 
Linear Regression w/Multicollinearity Diagnostics, RQs 1 & 2 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .416a .173 .165 3.74854 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Domestic_Credit, FDI 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 562.600 2 281.300 20.019 .000b 
Residual 2683.843 191 14.052   
Total 3246.443 193    
a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Domestic_Credit, FDI 
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Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 6.218 .374  16.635 .000 
FDI .103 .052 .136 1.974 .050 
Domestic_Credit -2.901E-015 .000 -.355 -5.161 .000 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant)   
FDI .913 1.095 
Domestic_Credit .913 1.095 
a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) FDI Domestic_Cre
dit 
1 
1 1.714 1.000 .15 .10 .10 
2 .976 1.325 .00 .33 .37 
3 .310 2.353 .85 .56 .53 
a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth 
 
If calculated in a linear regression model, the equation relating these three 
variables was as follows: 
GDP Growth = FDI(.103) + Domestic Credit(-2.901E-015) + 6.218 
It should also be noted that the low tolerance and VIF values indicate that FDI and 
domestic credit were not multicollinear in their predictive association with GDP. As clear 
from the earlier analyses, these two variables appeared to be functioning in entirely 
distinct ways in terms of their association with GDP.   
RQ3 Results 
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The third research question was as follows: Does inclusion of the covariate of 
corruption alter the relationship between the independent variables of (a) FDI and net 
domestic credit and (b) the dependent variable of economic growth in a sample of Asian 
countries from 1980-2012? This question was answered by running two correlations, one 
between FDI, domestic credit, and GDP growth and the second between FDI, domestic 
credit, and GDP growth after controlling for corruption. It was expected that corruption 
would exert a negative influence on the R value of the correlations between FDI and 
GDP; there was no hypothesis about how corruption would influence the relationship 
between domestic credit and GDP. The results were as follows:  
Table 6 
Correlations between GDP Growth, FDI, and Domestic Credit 
 GDP_Growth FDI Domestic_ 
Credit 
GDP_Growth 
Pearson Correlation 1 .241** -.398** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 .000 
N 198 194 198 
FDI 
Pearson Correlation .241** 1 -.295** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001  .000 
N 194 194 194 
Domestic_ 
Credit 
Pearson Correlation -.398** -.295** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 198 194 198 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
After controlling for corruption, neither the p nor the R values in the correlation table 
changed: 
Table 7 
Correlations between GDP Growth, FDI, and Domestic Credit, Controlling for 
Corruption 
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Control Variables GDP_Growth FDI Domestic_ 
Credit 
Corruption 
GDP_Growth 
Correlation 1.000 .241 -.400 
Significance (2-
tailed) . .001 .000 
Df 0 191 191 
FDI 
Correlation .241 1.000 -.296 
Significance (2-
tailed) .001 . .000 
Df 191 0 191 
Domestic_ 
Credit 
Correlation -.400 -.296 1.000 
Significance (2-
tailed) .000 .000 . 
Df 191 191 0 
 
The correlation between GDP and FDI was .241 (p < .001) before controlling for 
corruption. After controlling for corruption, the correlation between GDP and FDI was 
also .241 (p < .001). The correlation between GDP and domestic credit was -.398 (p < 
.001) before controlling for corruption. After controlling for corruption, the correlation 
between GDP and domestic credit was .400 (p < .001). Apparently, then, corruption has 
no tangible influence on how GDP interacts with either FDI or domestic credit. 
RQ4 Results 
The fourth research question was as follows: Is there a statistically significant 
relationship between corruption and economic growth in a sample of Asian countries 
from 1980-2012? A scatterplot revealed that there was no apparent pattern in the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth: 
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Figure 3. GDP Growth to Corruption 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that there no significant 
variation in GDP growth across corruption categories (p = .700): 
Table 8 
One-Way ANOVA, Corruption and GDP Growth 
GDP_Growth 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 36.796 4 9.199 .549 .700 
Within Groups 3234.712 193 16.760   
Total 3271.508 197    
 
Tukey’s test confirmed no GDP growth differences between any corruption 
category and any other corruption category: 
Table 9 
Tukey’s Test, Corruption and GDP Growth 
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Dependent Variable: GDP_Growth  
 Tukey HSD 
(I) 
Corruption 
(J) 
Corruption 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
S.E. Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
1 
2 .85595 .92192 .886 -1.6828 3.3947 
3 -.40199 .82295 .988 -2.6682 1.8642 
4 -.18094 .91378 1.000 -2.6972 2.3354 
5 -.34658 .93048 .996 -2.9089 2.2157 
2 
1 -.85595 .92192 .886 -3.3947 1.6828 
3 -1.25794 .91820 .648 -3.7864 1.2705 
4 -1.03689 1.00041 .838 -3.7918 1.7180 
5 -1.20253 1.01570 .761 -3.9995 1.5944 
3 
1 .40199 .82295 .988 -1.8642 2.6682 
2 1.25794 .91820 .648 -1.2705 3.7864 
4 .22105 .91003 .999 -2.2849 2.7270 
5 .05541 .92680 1.000 -2.4968 2.6076 
4 
1 .18094 .91378 1.000 -2.3354 2.6972 
2 1.03689 1.00041 .838 -1.7180 3.7918 
3 -.22105 .91003 .999 -2.7270 2.2849 
5 -.16564 1.00832 1.000 -2.9423 2.6110 
5 
1 .34658 .93048 .996 -2.2157 2.9089 
2 1.20253 1.01570 .761 -1.5944 3.9995 
3 -.05541 .92680 1.000 -2.6076 2.4968 
4 .16564 1.00832 1.000 -2.6110 2.9423 
 
Conclusion 
The results of hypothesis testing associated with the three research questions of 
the study were as follows: 
• There was a significant (p < .001), positive (beta coefficient = .498), and 
quadratic (R2 = .083) relationship between FDI and GDP growth. Quantile 
regression revealed that medium levels of FDI were most associated with higher 
GDP.  
• There was a significant (p < .001), negative (beta coefficient = -5.750E-015), and 
quadratic (R2 = .169) relationship between domestic credit and GDP growth. 
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Quantile regression revealed that low levels of domestic credit were associated 
with the highest levels of GDP growth. 
• Corruption was not a significant moderator or mediator of the relationship 
between (a) GDP and FDI or (b) GDP and domestic credit.  
• Corruption was not a significant predictor of GDP growth. 
A fuller interpretation of these results in light of past empirical literature, and in 
the context of national economic policy, will be presented in the fifth and concluding 
chapter of the study.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion of the Study 
FDI has been held to be an important contributor to GDP growth, even though the 
directionality of the relationship between these variables can be complex—-for example, 
FDI can stimulate GDP, and GDP growth can in turn attract further FDI. The simple 
regression model undertaken in this study was not designed to examine the directionality 
of the relationship, but rather to measure the correlation between FDI and GDP growth 
for a sample of Asian countries from 1980-2012. Interestingly, it was found that the 
relationship between FDI and GDP growth is better fit by quadratic regression than by a 
linear model; the so-called frown curve in the relationship between these variables 
suggested that GDP growth is highest at the middle ranges of FDI. Quantile regression 
revealed that having FDI (as % of GDP) at about the 70th percentile of the sample was 
most associated with high GDP growth; countries that had higher and lower FDI did not 
do as well. It is possible that countries attracting the highest FDI, relative to their GDP, 
experienced economic burn-out effects and therefore could not maintain high levels of 
FDI-driven GDP growth over longer periods of time. This hypothesis would have to be 
tested on shorter time slices of the data in order to determine whether such a burn-out 
effect exists; if it does, then there is a good argument for Asian economies to create and 
enforce policies that cap FDI at some fixed percentage of GDP in order to derive the 
sustainable long-term benefits of moderate FDI. Whatever the precise mechanism of the 
relationship between FDI and GDP growth, it does appear to be a viable long-term 
strategy for Asian countries to prevent overheating by inviting extremely high FDI, 
which can help to create economic volatility (for example, in times of crisis) or to 
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constrain national economic development in ways that are not beneficial to long-term 
growth.    
Another significant finding in the study was that there was an association between 
both low and high levels of domestic credit (measured as % of GDP) and high GDP 
growth. The smile shape of the quadratic curve fit to the data indicated that it was 
appropriate for Asian economies to avoid middle-of-the-road domestic credit policies. Of 
course, there are many reasons that the observed relationship between domestic credit 
and GDP growth might have come about. It is possible that countries in which domestic 
credit is low are obtaining foreign credit, or otherwise have capital formation structures 
that are not heavily reliant on domestic credit. Such countries might be more efficient, or 
have more access to international capital, both conditions that might in themselves be 
associated with higher GDP. Similarly, it is possible that countries with high levels of 
domestic credit either stimulate, or benefit from, growth spurts in the economy by 
flooding the market with credit. These hypotheses involve causation, which was not 
tested in the current study, but they might provide fruitful avenues for follow-up research 
among economists who are interested in Asian domestic credit dynamics. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the study, considering neoliberal and 
neoclassical theories about the relationship between corruption and growth, is that 
corruption (a) played no discernible role as a covariate between FDI and economic 
growth and (b) was, in its own right as an independent variable, an insignificant predictor 
of economic growth. The conclusions that can be drawn from these findings are as 
follows. First, FDI does not appear to be either thwarted or encouraged by the presence of 
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corruption. Second, corruption is not in itself either a retardant or an accelerator of 
economic growth; economic growth takes place in spite of a country’s corruption status. 
The findings about corruption appear to make more sense in light of the Asian 
Developmental Model discussed in the literature review than in light of neoliberal and 
neoclassical theories about the relationship between corruption and growth. As observed 
in the literature review, corruption has, at least in some contexts, become firmly 
embedded in the economic policies of Asian countries, notably South Korea and Japan. 
The corruption existing in these Asian countries is highly selective in nature; corruption 
is not universal in nature, but is rather delimited to key aspects of the relationship 
between the state and local businesses, in particular industrial conglomerates. 
Development in both Japan and South Korea has been enabled by the efficiency of the 
relationship between the state apparatus and industrial conglomerates; in particular, the 
use of favoritism, nepotism, and other kinds of corruption to enable government-to-
business loans, negotiate better terms of trade with foreign countries, facilitate the 
domestic production of export goods, and so forth, have all proven to be extremely 
effective in enabling the rapid growth of the Asian economies of Japan and South Korea, 
notwithstanding intermittent periods of stagnation. Understood from this perspective, the 
corruption that characterizes South Korea and other Asian economies can be understood 
as the cost of rapid development. 
Therefore, while it might seem cynical to do so, it appears warranted to 
recommend that Asian states with corruption as part of their developmental model do not 
attempt to root out corruption.  Such a recommendation can be sustained from an 
economic perspective; in other words, if the desideratum is economic growth, then 
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corruption is a non-issue. On the other hand, Asian states are also grappling with issues 
other than economics, including issues such as social justice. It will therefore fall to the 
citizens and policy-makers of these countries to reach some consensus about the national 
role of corruption, notwithstanding its apparent usefulness as part of the Asian 
Developmental Model. 
There is clearly much more work to be done on the analysis of the economic 
growth of East Asia. The current study identified some points of interest in the 1980-
2012 development of Asian economies considered in light of FDI, corruption, and 
domestic credit. These points require further analysis, particularly through the use of 
models that are more sensitive to causation and lag effects. The absence of these kinds of 
analysis was an important limitation of the current study.       
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Appendix A: Study Data 
Country Year GDP_Growth FDI Domestic_Credit Corruption 
1 1980 7.80 242250000000 1 
1 1981 5.20 273990000000 3 
1 1982 9.10 .21 304670000000 5 
1 1983 10.90 .28 343700000000 4 
1 1984 15.20 .49 451450000000 1 
1 1985 13.50 .54 592950000000 1 
1 1986 8.80 .63 794180000000 2 
1 1987 11.60 .86 970870000000 3 
1 1988 11.30 1.03 1153640000000 1 
1 1989 4.10 .99 1349790000000 3 
1 1990 3.80 .98 1668920000000 5 
1 1991 9.20 1.15 2002670000000 2 
1 1992 14.20 2.64 2449920000000 3 
1 1993 14.00 6.25 3575210000000 5 
1 1994 13.10 6.04 4310370000000 4 
1 1995 10.90 4.92 5331860000000 5 
1 1996 10.00 4.69 6642170000000 5 
1 1997 9.30 4.64 7954340000000 5 
1 1998 7.80 4.29 9546870000000 1 
1 1999 7.60 3.58 10701300000000 5 
1 2000 8.40 3.20 11873200000000 2 
1 2001 8.30 3.34 13487600000000 5 
1 2002 9.10 3.39 17262500000000 5 
1 2003 10.00 3.01 20628400000000 4 
1 2004 10.10 3.22 22441900000000 1 
1 2005 11.30 4.61 24836700000000 3 
1 2006 12.70 4.57 28873800000000 1 
1 2007 14.20 4.47 33965900000000 4 
1 2008 9.60 3.79 37937900000000 3 
1 2009 9.20 2.63 49458000000000 3 
1 2010 10.40 4.11 58732400000000 4 
1 2011 9.30 3.83 68797200000000 3 
1 2012 7.80 3.08 80559400000000 5 
2 1980 6.74 .04 554066000000 1 
2 1981 6.01 .05 675471000000 5 
2 1982 3.48 .04 820127000000 4 
2 1983 7.29 .00 952672000000 4 
2 1984 3.82 .01 1150140000000 3 
2 1985 5.25 .04 1351430000000 1 
2 1986 4.78 .05 1602980000000 4 
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2 1987 3.97 .07 1843850000000 1 
2 1988 9.63 .03 2175380000000 3 
2 1989 5.95 .08 2578200000000 1 
2 1990 5.53 .07 2929470000000 1 
2 1991 1.06 .03 3347370000000 5 
2 1992 5.48 .09 3766610000000 2 
2 1993 4.75 .19 4268580000000 5 
2 1994 6.66 .29 4808240000000 4 
2 1995 7.57 .58 5257480000000 1 
2 1996 7.55 .61 6294020000000 4 
2 1997 4.05 .85 7044420000000 3 
2 1998 6.18 .61 8150990000000 1 
2 1999 8.46 .47 9610950000000 5 
2 2000 3.98 .76 11145500000000 3 
2 2001 4.94 1.11 12455100000000 2 
2 2002 3.91 1.08 14446400000000 3 
2 2003 7.94 .70 15822200000000 3 
2 2004 7.85 .80 18669900000000 5 
2 2005 9.28 .87 21555200000000 3 
2 2006 9.26 2.11 26144000000000 1 
2 2007 9.80 2.04 30326600000000 1 
2 2008 3.89 3.55 38100800000000 1 
2 2009 8.48 2.61 45441700000000 1 
2 2010 10.55 1.55 56002800000000 4 
2 2011 6.33 1.72 66523600000000 1 
2 2012 3.24 76747400000000 1 
3 1980 -1.49 .01 16837600000000 1 
3 1981 6.16 .14 22085400000000 4 
3 1982 7.33 .09 27610000000000 3 
3 1983 10.77 .08 31941500000000 5 
3 1984 8.10 .12 36159700000000 1 
3 1985 6.80 .24 42675000000000 2 
3 1986 10.62 .41 48830100000000 1 
3 1987 11.10 .44 56635000000000 1 
3 1988 10.64 .54 62760300000000 4 
3 1989 6.74 .49 77179100000000 1 
3 1990 9.16 .30 96894400000000 3 
3 1991 9.39 .38 118169000000000 3 
3 1992 5.88 .22 131755000000000 3 
3 1993 6.13 .16 148124000000000 3 
3 1994 8.54 .19 175487000000000 5 
3 1995 9.17 .34 200194000000000 1 
3 1996 7.00 .42 240412000000000 2 
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3 1997 4.65 .55 291388000000000 3 
3 1998 -6.85 1.57 324476000000000 3 
3 1999 9.49 2.10 382180000000000 2 
3 2000 8.49 1.74 450598000000000 3 
3 2001 3.97 .70 881306000000000 3 
3 2002 7.15 .42 1022210000000000 3 
3 2003 2.80 .55 1041520000000000 5 
3 2004 4.62 1.28 1063790000000000 4 
3 2005 3.96 .75 1153900000000000 4 
3 2006 5.18 .38 1338110000000000 3 
3 2007 5.11 .17 1497900000000000 1 
3 2008 2.30 .36 1753330000000000 1 
3 2009 .32 .27 1812220000000000 4 
3 2010 6.32 .11 1911130000000000 3 
3 2011 3.68 .43 2041210000000000 3 
3 2012 2.04 .44 2146700000000000 2 
4 1980 10.05 10.42 10654000000 1 
4 1981 10.73 11.75 20195000000 5 
4 1982 7.19 10.00 20189000000 2 
4 1983 8.57 6.40 28789000000 3 
4 1984 8.83 6.63 33029000000 5 
4 1985 -.65 5.50 30134000000 4 
4 1986 1.29 9.23 30471000000 1 
4 1987 10.77 13.61 33530000000 3 
4 1988 11.07 14.44 34973000000 1 
4 1989 10.23 9.48 36782000000 4 
4 1990 10.11 15.45 41317000000 1 
4 1991 6.49 11.35 47053000000 5 
4 1992 7.03 4.49 49624000000 2 
4 1993 11.48 7.81 55583000000 3 
4 1994 10.58 12.35 62699000000 3 
4 1995 7.28 14.28 73638000000 1 
4 1996 7.63 10.23 86368000000 2 
4 1997 8.51 13.15 103251000000 3 
4 1998 -2.17 7.63 122081000000 2 
4 1999 6.20 19.28 120535000000 1 
4 2000 9.04 17.19 126640000000 2 
4 2001 -1.15 16.55 144625000000 1 
4 2002 4.20 7.07 121310000000 4 
4 2003 4.58 12.79 134001000000 2 
4 2004 9.16 19.23 137881000000 4 
4 2005 7.37 14.65 129707000000 3 
4 2006 8.62 26.40 144564000000 5 
 54 
 
4 2007 9.02 27.84 186076000000 4 
4 2008 1.75 6.82 206837000000 2 
4 2009 -.79 12.85 241830000000 5 
4 2010 14.78 24.69 260314000000 4 
4 2011 5.16 22.82 305880000000 1 
4 2012 1.32 20.62 343966000000 3 
5 1980 5.15 -.33 99053868250 4 
5 1981 3.42 .48 122144000000 3 
5 1982 3.62 .04 150977000000 2 
5 1983 1.87 .32 198826000000 3 
5 1984 -7.32 .03 206640000000 1 
5 1985 -7.31 .04 200124000000 1 
5 1986 3.42 .43 170651000000 5 
5 1987 4.31 .92 148318000000 3 
5 1988 6.75 2.47 157548000000 4 
5 1989 6.21 1.32 191415000000 3 
5 1990 3.04 1.20 250274000000 2 
5 1991 -.58 1.20 243863000000 3 
5 1992 .34 .43 286820000000 2 
5 1993 2.12 2.28 669631000000 1 
5 1994 4.39 2.48 813417000000 5 
5 1995 4.68 1.99 1062380000000 1 
5 1996 5.85 1.83 1475200000000 4 
5 1997 5.19 1.48 1906050000000 3 
5 1998 -.58 3.17 1868450000000 1 
5 1999 3.08 1.50 1911820000000 2 
5 2000 4.41 2.76 2088820000000 2 
5 2001 2.89 .26 2179920000000 2 
5 2002 3.65 1.90 2312850000000 2 
5 2003 4.97 .59 2471310000000 3 
5 2004 6.70 .75 2764060000000 3 
5 2005 4.78 1.61 2682550000000 1 
5 2006 5.24 2.22 3025720000000 3 
5 2007 6.62 2.17 3332340000000 1 
5 2008 4.15 .83 3663010000000 2 
5 2009 1.15 1.61 3909920000000 5 
5 2010 7.63 .82 4432560000000 2 
5 2011 3.91 .81 5046400000000 3 
5 2012 6.59 1.12 5375440000000 2 
6 1980 2.82 .03 428939000000000 3 
6 1981 4.18 .02 474355000000000 1 
6 1982 3.38 .04 523229000000000 1 
6 1983 3.06 .03 568220000000000 4 
 55 
 
6 1984 4.46 .00 617439000000000 5 
6 1985 6.33 .05 670040000000000 3 
6 1986 2.83 .01 732965000000000 4 
6 1987 4.11 .05 803430000000000 3 
6 1988 7.15 -.02 886511000000000 2 
6 1989 5.37 -.03 973523000000000 5 
6 1990 5.57 .06 1047620000000000 2 
6 1991 3.32 .04 1097260000000000 5 
6 1992 .82 .07 1153120000000000 1 
6 1993 .17 .00 1192590000000000 5 
6 1994 .86 .02 1228070000000000 3 
6 1995 1.94 .00 1268330000000000 3 
6 1996 2.61 .00 1313750000000000 2 
6 1997 1.60 .07 1143450000000000 2 
6 1998 -2.00 .08 1211750000000000 4 
6 1999 -.20 .28 1218140000000000 1 
6 2000 2.26 .17 1233190000000000 2 
6 2001 .36 .15 1191840000000000 4 
6 2002 .29 .23 1159910000000000 4 
6 2003 1.69 .14 1168120000000000 5 
6 2004 2.36 .17 1155370000000000 1 
6 2005 1.30 .09 1151670000000000 2 
6 2006 1.69 -.11 1115530000000000 2 
6 2007 2.19 .53 1092730000000000 4 
6 2008 -1.04 .61 1111980000000000 4 
6 2009 -5.53 .31 1117080000000000 5 
6 2010 4.65 .02 1131710000000000 4 
6 2011 -.57 .00 1151950000000000 4 
6 2012 1.95 1180800000000000 1 
 
